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Abstract
A stable money demand plays important role to conduct monetary policy as it enables a
policy-driven change monetary aggregates to have predictable influences on output, interest rate
and price. However, financial deregulation and financial innovation lead to break relationship
between money demand, income and interest rate. This paper examines the factors underlying
financial deregulation and investigates the implications of such deregulation to money demand
stability in Indonesia. The findings show that the relationship between money demand and
income is still stable, even though the relationship tends to be lessened. Money demand instability
resulted from financial deregulation was transitory and did not have permanent effect.
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Introduction
A stable money demand plays important role to conduct monetary policy as it enables
a policy-driven change in monetary aggregates to have predictable influences on output,
interest rate and ultimately price. In recent years deregulation and innovations in financial
markets have had widespread implications for the stability of money demand in several
countries. Because of its importance, theoretical and empirical researches on the stability
money demand have been conducted worldwide over the past several decades. According to
their findings, the relationships between money and income that held in the deregulated
framework were less stable than regulated framework (Hall (1983), Judd and Scadding (1982)).
Controls on interest rate limited the scope for interest rate to adjust; interest rates are not
necessarily reflect market values; thus leading to situation of excess demand or supply in
money markets. Quantity rationing in contractionary periods and unwinding of rationing in
expantionary periods established statistical correlation between the supply money and
income. Consequently lifting of control in financial markets resulted in a deterioration of the
old correlation between money and nominal income. Financial deregulation also lead to
more competition among financial institutions as the number of banks increases. The
competitions then encourage non-bank financial intermediaries to seek business from areas
previously directly, which change the process of intermediation and thus to the economic
growth. Consequently, determinants of demand for money changed sharply and then lead to
change stability real money demand. Meanwhile, Gurley and Shaw (1960) argued that
financial deregulation lead to financial innovation and then these financial innovations
have led to deterioration in the marginal relationship between real money balances and
interest rates.
As developing country, Indonesia have liberalized and deregulated financial
institutions since 1983. There were many reforms occurred during the 1983-1988 interval,
however the major reform that affect money demand occurred in 1983 and 19881 . The first
financial deregulation in the June 1, 1983 was three major areas, namely the abolition of the
credit ceiling, reducing liquidity credit to commercial bank provided by central bank, Bank
Indonesia, and giving freedom to state-owned banks to fix their interest rate and increasing
mobilization of fund from the public. These reduced the Government dependence on the
issue of fiat money as a source of revenue. This regulation also encourage monetary authorities
to switch monetary policy from direct control, such as credit ceiling, to indirect control, such
as open market operation. The second major financial deregulation occurred in 1988. Under
this deregulation, government allows public to open new banks and bank branches in order
to further promote fund mobilization from the public. The other purposes of that deregulation
were to increase the efficiency of banks and financial institutions, to raise effectiveness to
conduct monetary policy, and to develop capital market. There was a sharp increase in the
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number of bank and their branches since the financial deregulation. As a number of bank
increased, banks provide more financial services to the public, as a result the public deposits
increase dramatically during financial deregulation. As evidence from other countries,
financial deregulations lead to more competition among banks that cause changes in interest
rate spread quickly. Consequently, they lead to affect the stability and interest elasticity of
demand for money (Swamy and Tavlas (1989).
This paper examines the factors underlying financial deregulation and investigates
the implications of such deregulation to money demand stability in Indonesia. The remainder
of the paper divided by four sections. Section II describes a background Indonesia’s financial
deregulation started in 1983 and the effects of financial deregulation to money demand.
Section III discusses money demand model and two methods of stability test, namely Chow
test and Recursive least square test. In addition, this section also explained data that use to
estimate regressions. Section IV present empirical results. First, the results of real money
demand are analyzed. Second, the stability tests for demand for money are discussed. The
concluding observations and the policy implication of results are provided in section V.
The Development of Financial Deregulation in Indonesia
Before the financial system in Indonesia was deregulated in 1983, the system was
characterized by the financial repression. During these periods the main monetary policy
was credit ceiling policy and an administered interest rate regime.   Banks’ credit was also
allocated directly through selective credit control in which the scale of priorities of the credit
uses by economic sector, economic activities and recipients were determined by the authorities.
Monetary authorities imposed the credit ceiling policy in order to limit the loans of
each credit institution. Lowering loan to public limited the expansion of money supply to
economy. As a result, monetary authority could curb domestic inflation and lessened deficits
of balance of payments. In Banking sector, Government also limited to established new banks
and bank branches. Most part of bank liabilities came from central bank or government.
Government subsidized lending interest for small firms and special sector, such as logistic
institution that provide basic necessity to low income.
In June 1983 the authorities began announcing major fundamental financial
deregulation. The reforms made under deregulation measures of 1983 abolished the system
of credit ceilings, modified the complex system of liquidity credits and abolished regulations
on interest rate as a direct means of the monetary control. The objectives of these measures,
among others, were to create a favorable environment in the economic performance and
efficient allocation of resources. The policy particularly intended to reduce the reliance of
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banks on liquidity credit from Bank Indonesia as the main source of funds for extending
credits and to encourage bank to mobilize funds from the public. In addition, the improvement
in the efficiency of the banking system helped financial sector to play a significant role in
Indonesia’s development efforts. However, the deregulation of 1983 did not include either
institutional aspects or a climate which would enable banks to create new products and raise
efficiency of their operations.
To further develop financial system and to establish a sound financial system,
government took further action by undertaking a series of comprehensive policy measures in
the financial and monetary sector on October 27, 1988. The purpose of the deregulation was
to promote the mobilization funds, the increase of non-oil exports, the efficiency of bank and
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), the effectiveness in the implementation of monetary
policy and to create a climate for development of capital markets. Under this reform, monetary
authorities give the same opportunity to public to open new banks and bank branch offices.
The deregulation has changed financial sector dramatically. Since comprehensive
deregulation in 1988, the number of banks and their branches boosted from 125 commercial
bank (not included rural banks) and 2,358 branch offices in 1987 to 234 banks and 8,717
branch offices in 1993 (Table 1). The larger number of banks and their branches enable bank
to expand their market and increase their services to public. As a result financial deepening
increased sharply after deregulation, particularly after the deregulation of 1988. Ratio M2 to
GDP boost from 19 percent in 1983 to 28 percent in 1988 and 43 percent in 1993 (Table 1).
                    BANK OFFICES, AND RATI M2 TO GDP
Year Number of Bank Offices Ratio M2 to
Banks GDP
1982 131 1.475 0,18
1983 130 1.531 0,19
1984 129 1.598 0,20
1985 129 1.665 0,24
1986 125 1.751 0,25
1987 125 1.868 0,26
1988 124 2.044 0,28
1989 158 3.136 0,33
1990 185 4.494 0,40
1991 205 5.380 0,40
1992 221 5.580 0,42
1993 234 5.761 0,43
Not included rural banks
Sources: Bank Indonesia and Binhadi
Table 1. GROWTH IN NUMBER OF BANKS AND
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Monetary Policy and Money Demand in the Deregulated Financial System
Financial deregulation has set in motion changes in both manner in which monetary
policy is transmitted to the real economy and interest elasticity of demand for money. With
regards to the transmission mechanism, the introduction of a tender system of central selling
and buying bank securities, namely Bank Indonesia’s Certificate and money market securities
respectively, in 1984 increased monetary authorities’ potential control over injection liquidity
into the domestic monetary system, thus enhancing their ability to use open market operations
to influence domestic monetary conditions. Financial deregulation also contributed to a
weakening of non-price credit flows. Consequently, the effects of monetary policy are
increasingly transmitted through open market operations to the real economy through changes
in interest rates. Competition among banks lead to change in interest rates that tend to spread
quickly through financial assets and liabilities. Nevertheless, the transmission of monetary
actions to the real economy has probably lengthened compared with the previous regulated
system, which relied on quantity rationing. Specifically, in deregulated financial environment
the volume of deposits is determined by both demand and supply. Consequently, any
tightening of monetary policy by Bank Indonesia, Central Bank of Indonesia, will induce a
rise in deposits’ rates, resulting in an increase in the supply of deposits and offsetting to some
extent the Bank Indonesia’s effort to reduce growth of money. Thus, banks are now better able
to protect their deposit base and sustain their lending than they had been in the regulated
framework, in which the volume of deposits was primarily demand-determined.
The demand for credit may also have become less sensitive to interest rates in the
deregulated system. For example, increased use of floating interest rates and more innovative
and flexible loan packages may have resulted in less discouragement to marginal borrowers
as rates rise. Borrowers and lenders may also have become more accustomed to interest rate
variability and, as a result, may not materially their behavior until interest rates are perceived
to have shifted in a sustained manner.
The Demand for Money
A precondition for the successful implementation of monetary targeting is the existence
of stable and predictable relationship between the targeted monetary aggregate and economic
activity. The recent financial changes, however, have altered the interest rate elasticity of
demand for money and have made it more difficult to differentiate among the various
aggregates, thus contributing to money demand instability (Swamy and Tavlas (1989).
With regard to the interest rate elasticity of demand for money, the move to market-
related yield on bank deposits has resulted in decline in the interest elasticity of monetary
aggregates, such as M2. Financial deregulation has resulted in an increased share of financial
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instruments within M2 that offer market-determined rates. The yields on those instruments
are closely related to the rates on assets held by depository institutions, leaving differential
unchanged. Because the opportunity cost of holding money balances is the spread between
the own rate of return on money and the market yield on substitute financial assets, that
deposit rates move closely up or down with market rates in the deregulated system signifies
that opportunity cost of money varies less than do market rates. Consequently, the demand
for deposits, however sensitive to the differential between market rates and deposit rates, has
become less sensitive to the general level of interest rates; a larger change in markets yields is
required to achieve a particular change in relative yields than was necessary when deposit
rates were controlled. Accordingly, if interest rates are used to affect changes in the money
supply, large changes in market rates are now required to attain given changes in the money
supply than was the case in deregulated financial system. Financial deregulation has also
contributed to shifts in the demand for money. The greater number of banks increased
competition among financial institutions and encouraged non-bank financial intermediaries
to seek business from areas previously financed directly, which added to the process of
intermediation and thus to the growth. Consequently, determinants of money demands
changed sharply. These factors contributed to a surge in M2 growth. One year after
deregulation of 1988, M2 growth reached 39.1 % in 1989 compared with a rate of 22.8% in
1987. As a result income velocity of M2 fell from 3.8 in the end of 1987 to 3.1 in 1989. In line
with M2, M1 growth accelerated from 9.2% in 1987 to 15.9% in 1989, however on average M1
growth lower than M2 growth. The lower rate of M1 growth reflected the fact that interest
rates on demand deposits, a large component of M1, did not increase in line with interest
rates on other financial instruments included in M2, resulting in a shift into deposit.
Figure 1. Velocity of M2
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The foregoing shifts in money demand reflect adjustments from one financial regime to
another and may, therefore, be transitory. However, financial deregulation may also involve
a more sustained degree of instability of money balances. For examples, since M2 now includes
a larger proportion of financial instruments yielding market-related rates, deregulation
probably induced an increased flow of investment balances into M2, resulting in an
amalgamation of funds held for transactions balances with those held for investment balances.
Because investment balances tend to be more responsive than transaction balances to small
changes in the broad range of interest rate spreads (including common stocks), the potential
exists for M2 to be dominated by shifts in the composition of the public’s portfolio rather than
by changes in income and prices, resulting in a greater degree of instability in the demand for
money (Judd (1983)). Meanwhile Gurley and Shaw argued that financial deregulation lead
to financial innovations. The more financial products then lead to a deterioration in the
marginal relationship between real money balance and interest rate. Fair (1983) conducted
test for the stability of money demand before and after 1973 in twenty countries individually.
He found that 13 cases rejected at the 5% level and 7 cases were not rejected. Structural
instability of money demand are generally moderate, and most happening in the countries
that deregulated their financial system.
To summarize, financial deregulation has lowered the interest elasticity of the
demand for money and has furnished the potential for both transitory and permanent money
demand instability, tough among economists do not accept this idea. They believed that the
instability of demand for money more likely transitory (Goldfeld 1976, and Simpson and
Porter 1980). In terms of the Hicksian IS-LM schedule, other things remaining equal, larger
changes in interest rates are associated with given changes in the supply of money. Where
money balance are now held for investment purposes, as well as to satisfy transaction needs,
however, means that the variance associated with given monetary policy changes has also
increased; a wider bank of uncertainty is associated with any given change in the quantity of
money.
The-Demand-for-money function and Stability Test
The-Demand-for-money function
A partial adjustment model (PAM) as proposed by Chow and later popularized by
Goldfeld (1973) is used to determine the demand for real money balances. In PAM framework,
actual money balances adjust to the gap between desired or long-run demand for real money
balances and the previous money holding. In general term, the demand for real money balances
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is specified as a positive function of real per capita income and negative function of the
opportunity cost of holding as reflected in rate of interest.  Formally partial adjustment model
for the money demand function in log-linear terms can be written as :
Ln (M/P) = a0 + a1 ln yt + a2 ln R + a3 ln (M/P)t-1 + εt     (1)
Where M represents nominal narrow (M1) or broad (M2). M1 define as currency plus
demand deposit, while M2 define as M1 plus saving and time deposits; P is the consumer
price index (1990=100); y measures real GDP; R is rate of interest, 6-month deposit rate; et
stands for an error term; a1 and a2 are the elasticities of money with respect to interest rate
and income. They expected that a1 has negative sign and a2 has positive sign. To test the
hypothesis that financial deregulation have lowered the interest elasticity money demand
and further affect money demand instability, equation (1) will be estimated using quarterly
data from 1968.I to 1997.IV. The method as proposed Sims (1980), and Hafer and Hein (1984)
will be conducted. The period of estimation will be divided based on the timing of deregulation.
The estimation begin with the fifteen-year period 1968.I-1983.IV and increment this initial
sample by adding five years to the start and end point. “log-rolling” the sample in the manner
yields 4 regression equations, the last of which covers of 1983.I-1997.IV, a period substantial
financial deregulation in Indonesia.
Test of Stability
Chow’s Test
An econometric relationship is stable if the parameters are not subject to permanent
changes over time. Thus, to test the stability of money demand after financial deregulation
cannot exclusively derive from the coefficient of money demand function as stated in section
II. In order to know the stability of money demand function, two methods of stability test are
conducted to money demand functions. In general, statistical tests made to determine whether
a regression relationship is stable over the entire period observation have been limited either
to using dummy variables when the change in the relationship suspected as proposed by
Chow (1960). The Chow test is implemented by estimating the following version of (1):
Ln (M/P) = a0 + a1 ln yt + a2 ln R + a3 ln (M/P)t-1 + a4Dt  εt     (2)
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Where all variables are defined as equation (1) and D is a zero-one dummy that equals
1 in the post-breakpoint period and zero otherwise. The stability of the money demand model
is examined by testing the statistical significance of the slope dummies in (2).
The Chow test requires a priori knowledge of the point in time when the function
shifts, and this knowledge may not readily available as Khan (1974) pointed out. However,
this model is reliable to apply since we know that comprehensive financial deregulation in
Indonesia occurred on June 1, 1983 and October 27, 1988.
Recursive Least Square Test
As mentioned above, there are weaknesses the Chow’s test, therefore we proposed
alternative test that do not require this a priori information as proposed by Brown and
Durbin (1968) and devised by Goldfeld and Quandt (1972) and Kahn (1974). Basically, the
Brown-Durbin method requires the calculation of one period prediction residuals, which are
obtained by applying the regression computed with r-1 observations to predict the rth
observation using k explanatory variable (including the constant). The method utilizes a
statistic Sr which equals the ratio of the sum of squares of one-period prediction residuals
from the k + 1 period to the  Tth period, T being sample size. The null hypothesis that the
regression is constant over time implies that the expectation of the statistics Sr, E(Sr), will lie
along its mean-value line.
Consider the standard regression model:
Yt = Xt’βt + εt (3)
Where Yt is a vector of observations on the dependent variable, Xt is a column vector of
observations on the k regressors,  bt is vector of regression coefficients and et is residual with
zero means. The first element in each Xt is one, and the remaining are nonstochastic.
The hypothesis to be tested is
β1 = β2 = … = βt = β
Consider  βr be the least-squares estimate of β  from  the sample of the first r observations,
and let
                    yr – xr’βr-1
Wr = —————————————— , r = k+1,…,T (4)
√1 + xr’(X’r-1Xr-1)-1 xr
where X’r-1 = [x1,…,xr-1].
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The variable we can be obtained without repeated matrix inversion by the relations
βr = βr-1 + (X’rXr)-1 x’r(yr – x’rbr-1 (5)
and
    (X’r-1Xr-1)-1 x’r(X’r-1Xr-1)-1
   (X’rXr)-1 =   (X’r-1Xr-1)-1  -   —————————————— (6)
         1 +  x’r(X’r-1Xr-1)-1
If βt is constant up to time t = to and different from then on, the wr will have mean zero
up to to and nonzero mean from then on. Brown and Durbin suggest plotting the following
variable against time as follows:
Sr = (∑ wt2)/ (∑ wt2) r = k + 1,…,T (6)
The value of Sr will lie between zero and one: Sr = 0 if r < k+1; Sr = 1 if r = T. The
expectation of Sr is E(Sr) = (r-k)/(T-k), and on the null hypothesis that β’s are constant, the
plot of Sr should be lie along this mean value-line.
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As Melnick (1995) pointed out that the instability of money demand possible come
from the improper use of the traditional econometric approach. Therefore, before testing it’s
stability, we need to check whether or not money demand function is not miss-specified.
According to above results, adjusted R2 for all regressions are between 97.9 percent and 99.7
percent and all coefficients of independent variables have correct sign. Income has positive
relationship with money demand, while interest rate has negative relationship with money
demand. Hence, we can conclude that the above money demand function is appropriate to
test the stability demand for money. An interesting pattern emerges from the estimated
coefficients.  All estimated coefficient of income on both regression in each period are significant
at five percent level. The coefficients decline overtime, except from 1973.I – 1988.IV for M2
Empirical Results
The “rolling over” regression results for equation (1) are presented on table 2 as follows:
y g
Estimation Period Constant Yt Rt (M/P)t-1 R2 σ ω
M1:
1968.I - 1982.IV -3,938 0,483 -0,040 0,758 0,993 0,053 2,164
(-2.505) (3.018) (-0.671) (14.585)
1973.I - 1987.IV -3,311 0,461 -0,035 0,703 0,992 0,039 1,970
(-3.699) (3.847) (-2.642) (9.520)
1978.I - 1992.IV -0,976 0,154 -0,003 0,875 0,985 0,042 1,909
(-0.986) (1.234) (-0143) (13.039)
1983.I - 1997.IV -1,293 0,192 -0,020 0,845 0,979 0,048 2,189
(-2.137) (2.098) (-0.958) (11.034)
M2:
1968.I - 1982.IV -3,214 0,389 -0,050 0,822 0,995 0,052 2,305
(2.308) (2.834) (-0.868) (22.700)
1973.I - 1987.IV -4,467 0,556 -0,042 0,732 0,997 0,033 2,001
(-4.050) (4.083) (-2.868) (11.032)
1978.I - 1992.IV -3,082 0,360 -0,003 0,871 0,996 0,040 2,483
(-1.968) (1.997) (-0.175) (13.527)
1983.I - 1997.IV -1,700 0,208 -0.017 0,907 0,996 0,041 2,538
(-1.724) (1.785) (-0.849) (18.073)
Summary Statistics**)Estimated Coefficients*)
Table 2
Money Demand Regression Result : 1968.I - 1997.IV
*)   All variable enter logarithmically. Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses
**) R2 is the cefficient of determination adjusted degrees of freedom, s is the standard error of the regression, w is
  Durbin-watson statistic
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regression.  These results showed that financial deregulation affect the coeeficient of income
and further affect the stability of money demand.
Finally, most coeffients of interest rate are insignificant event at ten percent level. The
coeffient of interest rate is just significant at five percent level in M1 regression during period
1973.I-1987.IV. However, interest elasticities for M1 and M2 tend to be lower as sample
period close to financial deregulation period. The results are in line with propositon that
financial deregulation has lowered the interest elasticity to money demand due to money
balance are now held not just for transaction motive but also for investment. However, the
findings show that there are no significant cange in money demand function as shown on
high R2 and no significant changes on R2 for M2 regression, although R2 for regression M1
tend be lower after financial deregulation.
Based on rolling over regression it is not clear money demand function is stable during
period of financial deregulation, eventhough coefficien of interest elasticities tend to be lower
during the financial deregulation. In order to find out whether money demand stable over
time, chow test is conducted. Before conducting chow test, I examine money demand regression
for whole sample, 1968.I – 1997.IV. The results are reported on table 3. All coefficients of
Table 3
Money Demand Regression  and Chow Test Result
*)   All variable enter logarithmically. Absolute values of t-statistics are shown in parentheses
**)  R2 is the cefficient of determination adjusted degrees of freedom, s is the standard error of the regression, w is
   Durbin-watson statistic
***) Break points are determined from closet quarter period after deregulation until the next three period (to
   implement new regulation need time)
Description Constant Yt Rt (M/P)t-1 R2 σ ω
1968.I - 1997.IV
- M1 -1,548 0,229 -0,015 0,835 0,996 0,051 2,252
(-4.221) (4.542) (-1.240) (26.194)
-M2 -2,830 0,345 -0,042 0,840 0,999 0,046 2,350
(-5.326) (5.426) (-4.295) (30.888)
Chow Test ***)
- Break Point: F-statistics p-value F-statistics p-value
  - 1983.II 1,416 0,233 0,632 0,640
  - 1983.III 1,260 0,290 0,636 0,638
  - 1983.IV 1,163 0,331 0,631 0,641
  - 1984.I 0,873 0,483 0,622 0,648
  - 1988.IV 1,681 0,159 2,048 0,093
  - 1989.I 1,383 0,244 2,292 0,064
  - 1989.II 2,117 0,083 1,678 0,160
  - 1989.III 1,515 0,203 3,262 0,014
Estimated Coefficients*) Summary Statistics**)
M1 Equation M2 Equation
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money demand regressions have the correct sign, however coefficient of interest rate for M1
regression is not significant even at ten percent level, while coefficient of interest rate for M2
is significant at one percent level.
Chow test then is conducted based on full sample data by using equation (2) and
setting dummy variable that equals 1 in the post-breakpoint period and zero otherwise. The
money demand stability is conducted by testing the statiscal significance of the slope of
dummy variables. As described on section two, financial ocurred on June 1, 1983 and on
October 27, 1988, therefore the selection of break point started from the closest period after
financial deregulation ocurred until the next three periods (I assume that there are time lag to
implement the new measures). The results of implementing chow test are reported on table 3.
According to those results, the probability value of F-statistics for M1 regression are generally
low. These results imply that the reforms in 1983 and 1988 do not change structural stability
of M1 demand. The reform of 1983 also do not affect the stability of real M2 demand. However,
the second financial deregulation has shifted structural stability of demand for M2 as reflected
in the value of F-statistics at period 1989.III that rejects  the hyphotesis of structural stability
for M2-money demand at 5 percent level.  This result is in line with Hall (1982), since allowing
public to open new banks and their branches lead to more competition among financials
institution. The competition encourage financial institution to create new financial services.
Consequently, it leads to change determinant of money demand and thus the stability of
money demand function.
Finally, recursive least sequare test are conducted by calculating cumulative square
error of regressions. The results are presented on figure 2 and 3 below:
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Stability Test for M1
14 Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan, Juni 2002
According to the results, the CUSUM squares for M1-money demand function during
period 1976.IV move to top boundary, however the values still lies within the boundry for the
whole periods. During the first deregulation of 1983, the CUSUM squares of M1 regression
just slightly move upward. During the second deregulation of 1988, a series dramatic jump
and then after the forth quarter went down to initial series, however the series still lie within
the boundary. These findings implies that demand for M1 are stable after both financial
deregulations. Shock from financial reforms to money demand was temprorary effect and do
not change structural stability of M1 demand. These results are in line with Fair’s finding
(1983) that showed money demand in developing country tend to be stable, since public still
used currency as the most part of transaction.
Interesting results are shown on CUSUM squares of M2 regression. During period
1973.IV – 1979.IV, the series of  CUSUM squares lie over its upper boundary at five percent
level. The deregulation of 1983 did not much affect the value of CUSUM squares, the values
just go up slightly. The results are reasonable since government just remove credit ceiling and
interest rate ceiling for stated banks, while institutional reforms do not included in this
reform. However, the second deregulation of 1988 has big effect to the values of CUSUM
squares. After the reforms, the CUSUM squares raises sharply and the values passed upper
bound during period 1990.III – 1992.I before going down again. The results show that huge
financial deregulation in 1988 changes structural stability of demand for M2. However, the
structural change tend to be transitory since the values of CUSUM squares go back to band at
five percent of significant level.
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Concluding Remark and Policy Implications
Hal (1982), and Swamy and Tavlas (1989) pointed out that deregulation and
innovations in financial markets in recent years had implication to relationship between
money, income and interest rate. The lifting of controls in financial markets and financial
innovation resulted the break down of stable and predictable relationship. Financial
deregulation has resulted in an increased the share of financial instruments within M2 that
offer market-determined rate, where interest rate spread quickly through assets and liabilities.
Consequently, determinants of money demand change sharply and lead to change structural
stability of money demand. The evidence presented in this study suggests that the interest
elasticity  and income elasticity tend to be lower after financial reforms, however, relationship
between money and income is still stable and predictable.
 Financial deregulation in 1983 and 1988 do not change structural stability of demand
for M1 as shown in low F-statistics and the values of CUSUM squares lie within the band at
five percent level. The reform of 1988 just moved demand for M1 temporary. These results
imply that there is no significant change for M1-money demand. The results make sense
since public still use currency and demand deposit as main medium of exchange. However,
there shifted structural stability of demand for M2 since the second financial deregulation.
Chow test indicates that the hypothesis of structural stability was rejected at 5 percent in
1989.III. It makes sense since allowing public to open new banks and their branches lead to
more competition among banks and to increase saving and time deposit banks, as part of
components of M2. The competition also lead to create financial innovation and the last lead
to change determinant of money demand and thus stability of money demand. However, the
money demand  instability was transitory and did not change money demand stability
permanently.
An implication of these results that quantity targeting is still reliable since money
demand for M1 is stable and income elasticity to money is stable, though elasticity lessen but
statiscally the change is insignificant. However, since relationship between money and
interest rate is unstable and insignificant, monetary authority cannot be totally use interest
rate targeting to implement monetary policy. Hence, eclectic approach is more reliable as
means to conduct monetary policy.
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